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The last seventy years have presented Crimean Tatars with profound challenges and enormous 
hardship. They suffered greatly at the hands of the Soviet government during their deportation of 
1944 and their return in the late 1980s, and they are being discriminated against by the Russian 
Government following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the Soviets recaptured Ukraine 
from the Wehrmacht in 1944, Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia based on accusations 
of willingly supporting the enemy, killing innocent Ukrainian civilians, and conspiring to establish 
a Crimean Tatar republic under German rule. The presentation of this group as traitors and enemies 
of the Soviet people was used as a foundation for discriminative policies during their return to 
Crimea. Now they are facing oppressive measures implemented by the Russian government in 
Crimea, which are being justified based on accusations of extremism and radicalism.
In order to understand the structures and dynamics of the current identity-based conflict in 
Crimea that has led to the brutal oppression of Crimean Tatars after the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in 2014, it is necessary to understand the political and social legacies of Stalinist repression, 
and the impact of that repression on the development of the systems of identity for Crimean 
Tatars and Russians over the last fifty years. The case study presented in this paper covers a vastly 
understudied area in the literature of Ukrainian studies, Russian studies, and genocide studies, 
which has theoretical and practical implications for our understanding of conflict and identity in 
post-Soviet Russia, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine. 
The analysis in this article represents a clear case of categorical violence. Johan Galtung 
developed the concepts of direct, cultural, and structural violence.1  While direct violence describes 
open cases of aggression, structural violence is understood as injustice and exploitation built into a 
social system of inequalities, and cultural violence is based on the prevailing attitudes and beliefs 
in the society. This article shows that Crimean Tatars were victims of all three forms of violence 
described by Galtung. They were deported by the Stalinist regime, were harassed upon their return 
to Crimea in 1990s and brutally beaten and killed during the current occupation regime in Crimea. 
The political structures of Soviet Union and current Putin’s Russia supported these aggressive 
policies, while a culture of paternalism and submission to power justified violent actions. 
This article states that the prevailing form of violence against Crimean Tatars was categorical 
violence. This violence is based on the social category (ethnic, religious, regional, national, gender, 
age, etc) that is ascribed to a particular group. It can be related to existing identities of this group, 
or it can be created by the authority or group in power.  Because of belonging to a specific social 
category, a particular group can be denied some rights or access to resources and power (economic 
and political discrimination), to basic needs, including food (famine), territory (deportation), or 
right to exist (genocide). Members of a particular social group can experience exceptional hardship 
only because of their membership in this group that is perceived as treacherous, rebellious, or just 
secondary. 
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Both social category as a perception of a group by others, and social identity as a membership 
in a group, are products of a process of boarder formation, drawing distinctions between an 
“us” and a “them.”2 The constitution of social actors is often shaped through the drawing and 
redrawing of social boundaries, as well as the invention and borrowing of the boundaries, and 
encounters between previously distinct and competing networks of social actors, which can all lead 
to the formation of categories of social actors.3 Communities often recognize clear boundaries that 
represent distinctive ways of life, and may mobilize themselves by perceiving these boundaries 
as endangered by a threat from outside.4 In such a way, the mobilization of conflicting parties 
often accompanies an increased clarity of group boundaries amongst the individuals in conflict.5 
These contracted and reconstructed social boundaries help justify categorical violence toward 
specific groups that are placed outside of the boundary of powerful groups. This article shows how 
Crimean Tatars were placed outside the boundary of loyal Soviet people during Soviet Union, and 
outside the boundary of loyal Crimean residents during the current Russian occupation of Crimea. 
They became victims of categorical violence that targeted this specific ethnic group for decades. 
The paper begins with a description of the deportation of Crimean Tatars, and provides a brief 
review of the German Occupation of Crimea in order to provide the historical context necessary 
for examining how Soviet propaganda participated in clarifying the group identify of the Crimean 
Tatars as an other outside the boundaries of Soviet identity. The case study presents an account 
of the negative images of Crimean Tatars published in Soviet newspapers between 1941-1943, and 
shows how these portrayals accompanied the explicit rationale given by the Soviet authorities for 
the deportation of Crimean Tatars.
After outlining the relevant historical context of the Soviet repression of Crimean Tatars and 
the identity boundaries that were concretized after the Second World War, the paper proceeds to 
review the mitigation of hostilities against Tatars in the years following the war in order to show how 
the boundaries between Crimean Tatars’ and Soviet identities were redrawn to present Crimean 
Tatars as being insiders, or outsiders, depending on changing political and social contexts. The 
argument, for example, shows that during the German occupation of Crimea, Soviet propaganda 
presented the Crimean Tatars as little brothers, mobilizing popular support for the Crimean Tatars 
by positioning Tatar identity with the family of the Soviet nation. However, when the political 
demands of the Soviet government shifted after the Second World War, Soviet newspapers began 
presenting the Crimean Tatars as traitors to the USSR, who were a different, dangerous national 
group and had to be removed. 
The terms national, nation, and nationality in English often denote a group of people united by 
common descent, history, or culture who form a political social body, oftentimes a state. Russian 
society and Soviet politics, however, has a long history of conceptualizing nations and nationalities 
in different terms, which has a great deal of overlap with the concept of ethnicity. Beginning around 
the 1930s, the boundaries of national identities in the USSR were often delineated ideologically. As 
the socialist regimes collapsed and central authority fragmented after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
social categorization based on ideological models became irrelevant. The creation of the new 
independent states, the development of concepts of national identity, the rise of ethnic autonomies 
and enlargement of the European Community lead to changes in the system of identity. The 
movement from totalitarianism to political pluralism after 1989 was connected to the construction 
of a state and the reshaping of national identities. Most post-Soviet national identities are now 
political and are defined by the state. In this post-Soviet space, when a country declared itself a 
“national state,” it led to an ethnic definition of “nationality.”6 
The paper continues with accounts of the attempts to repatriate Crimean Tatars after 1989 and 
the discriminative policies against the returning people. The main contention is that the categories 
of ethno-national social identity that are structuring the current conflict Crimea were concretized by 
the fall of the USSR. In the 1990s, the population of Crimea was nearly 2.5 million, with 64 percent 
of the population identifying themselves as ethnic Russians, 23 percent as Ukrainians, 10 percent as 
Crimean Tatars, and 3 percent as Byelorussians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, and others. This 
meant that Crimea was the only large-scale administrative-territorial district in Ukraine where the 
ethnic majority consisted of ethnic Russians. At the same time, the people who identified themselves 
as ethnic Crimean Tatars considered Crimea as the motherland that formed their ethnic group. 
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Because of the history of Soviet repression against Tatars and Muslims, Crimean Tatars viewed 
ethnic Russians as threats to their security, despite the fact that the Russians living in Crimea in 
1989 were not responsible for committing Soviet atrocities. The Crimea of the 1990s, therefore, 
had substantial potential for ethnopolitical violence. 7 It is through this context that the current 
political discourse of Crimean Tatars as anti-Russian radical extremists, which is being employed 
by the Russian government in Crimea to justify repression of the Crimean Tatars, was forged. As 
the case study demonstrates, this dynamic of presenting Crimean Tatars as extremist nationals was 
firmly established through the context of Soviet polices. It was very common for proponents of the 
USSR, and for Soviet propaganda, to portray the USSR as a fatherland for all people residing in 
its territory regardless of their ethnic or national identity. This made the Crimean Tatar desire to 
return to a designated homeland after their deportation seem like a lack of patriotism, so that the 
very act of Tatars pursuing repatriation (among other rights) was viewed as the work of extremist 
nationals.8 
The conclusion of the article describes current hardships experienced by Tatars in occupied 
Crimea. These hardships grew out of the resentment amongst ethnic Russians living in Crimea 
against the resettlement of Crimean Tatars, which produced conflicts over land, property, and 
citizenship. That Crimean Tatars received state donations to fund their resettlement increased 
negative attitudes towards Crimean Tatars amongst ethnic Russians, who had experienced 
economic deprivations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Crimean Tatars considered 
it legitimate to reclaim the property, possessions, and national-territorial autonomy that they had 
been deprived of when they were deported from Crimea by the Soviet authorities. This dynamic 
legitimized Russian irredentist autonomy claims after 1989, with Russians perceiving themselves as 
being marginalized by Crimean Tatars even though ethnic Russians had far better access to jobs and 
education. Crimean Tatar protestations against discrimination in housing, employment, education, 
and politics provoked ethnic Russians into feeling threatened by a Crimean Tatar minority. Hence, 
the goals of Russians and Crimean Tatars were incompatible with the formation of a common 
national identity in post-Soviet Crimea in Ukraine.9 But, more importantly for understanding the 
current repression of Crimean Tatars, this discourse has become the primary discourse through 
which the repression of ethnic Crimean Tatars is rationalized, legitimized, and perpetrated by the 
Russian government in Crimea.  
 
The Deportation of Crimean Tatars
During Second World War, Crimea was among the first Soviet territories occupied by the 
Wehrmacht, the German occupying army. Taking the British colonial rule over India as their 
model, the German occupying authorities resorted to a divide-and-rule strategy for dominating the 
occupied population.10 However, because they lacked sufficient manpower for complete control, 
the German army sought support from certain segments of the local population, recruiting them 
to serve in the local police force or in lower levels of government.11 Historians have pointed out 
that the German attempt to divide and conquer occupied regions of the USSR aligned with the 
interest of Crimean Tatar nationalists who wanted an independent Tatar nation-state.12 Crimean 
Tatar nationalist leaders worked with German authorities in Berlin, even though they frequently 
complained that the Germany authorities were attempting to exploit and curtail Crimean Tatar 
nationalist ambitions to fit German interests.13 Regardless, the German attempts to divide and 
conquer relied on tactics of ethnic division, whereby the Wehrmacht carefully exploited ethnic 
tensions and favored Crimean Tatars over other groups.14
Crimean Tatars are a Turkic-speaking people. They represent a mixture of the ancient Gothic 
and Alan populations who settled in Eastern Europe in the 7th century. The name Tatars first 
emerged in the 13th century, when the Mongol Golden Horde occupied the peninsula. As the 
non-Turkic population became assimilated with other Crimeans via shared religion, language, and 
culture, Tatars formed an independent state known as the Crimean Khanate—a political entity 
ruled by a khan, on the model of the invading Mongols. This state remained independent until the 
Russian Empire began to expand in the 17th century. 
Upon Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in the 18th century, the Crimean Khanate 
lost its autonomy. The relationships between Crimean Tatars and the Russian empire periodically 
Korostelina36
©2015     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1319
intensified, culminating in the Crimean War in 1854. The mutual mistrust between the imperial 
Russian and Crimean Khanate governments further strained relations in the peninsula, forcing 
many Tatars to leave for the Ottoman Empire for fear of retaliation and possible resettlement within 
the Russian heartland. Though many Tatars remained in Crimea, by 1917 Tatars made up only a 
quarter of the population there.15 
In its early years of power following the Russian Revolution, the Soviet regime followed a policy 
created by Lenin to support the national autonomy of minority national groups throughout the 
Soviet Union. The Russian empire had been a multi-national empire, and the new Soviet government 
had to find a way to rein in the nationalist ambitions of the various national groups—such as 
Ukrainians, Kazaks, Belarusians, Tatars, and many more—who spoke their own languages, held 
their own particular religious traditions, and demanded the right to national self-determination.16 
In order to convince these groups to support the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin initially promised 
to support national self-determination within the USSR, and promote the autonomy of national 
minorities. By the early 1930s, however, the Soviet regime found this policy untenable, and turned 
to policies intended to coerce nationalist groups into submission to the authority of Moscow. The 
political ambitions of various national groups were handled an individual basis through policies 
that ranged from banning national languages, to state-orchestrated famines, massacres, forced 
resettlements, interment in gulags, and the imprisonment or extrajudicial executions of members 
of the intelligentsia of the various national groups.
In 1934, in an attempt to assert Soviet control over Crimea, Crimea was divided into zoning 
districts, where the territories with a predominance of a certain national or ethnic group were 
transformed into independent administrative units. 177 regional self-regulatory bodies, the majority 
of them Crimean Tatars, were created, including units in the Alushta, Balaklavsky, Bakhchisaray, 
Karasubazarsky, Kuibyshev, Sudak, and Yalta regions. Moreover, a number of ethnic schools were 
established, where Crimean Tatars could teach their own language and their own curriculum. 
Newspapers and magazines were published in the Crimean Tatar language. 
During his leadership of the Soviet government, Stalin changed many of the policies regarding 
the rights of national and ethnic groups. Historians have termed these policies of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s to be indicative of an “Affirmative Action Empire,” where Stalin believed that 
sanctioning nationalist autonomy for minority groups allowed Moscow to dictate the contents 
of their national culture and thereby circumscribe the political ambitions of these groups.17 This 
contradiction between promoting national autonomy while crushing the political ambitions 
of national groups was common throughout the USSR. Lenin and Stalin had both used the 
establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921 as a propaganda tool 
to demonstrate that Soviet power was just and fair, offering political and cultural autonomy to the 
nations who respected Soviet authority.18 The establishment of the republic was followed by famine 
that some have considered to be a state-orchestrated famine, which killed over 100,000 Crimeans, 
most of whom were Tatar. By 1928, the nationalist leaders who Lenin and Stalin supported in 1921 
were shot to death, and the USSR sought to eliminate the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia—all while 
proclaiming Crimean Tatar cultural autonomy.19
These policies across the USSR did not quell nationalist resistance to the Soviet program of 
collectivizing land and property. In Crimea, as elsewhere in the USSR, this brief period of regained 
autonomy was not to last. Stalin, by the mid 1930s, adopted a policy of destroying national identity 
across the USSR and creating a new Soviet national identity for the Soviet state. In this campaign 
to create a single Soviet nation, aspirations for the distinct identity of minorities were brutally 
suppressed. These repressions led to mass arrests and the destruction of hundreds of religious 
buildings (mosques, temples, synagogues, etc.) in Crimea. The independent ethnic administrative 
units were terminated and Crimean Tatars—among others—lost their religious freedoms and their 
right to send their children to ethnic schools, where they could be educated in their native language. 
During the German occupation of the Ukraine in the Second World War, the situation changed 
yet again. The German occupying authorities enticed Crimean Tatars with special privileges, and 
invited Tatar nationalist leaders to Berlin.20 They distributed gardens to the Tatars, which was a 
highly symbolic act given that the Soviet Union had abolished private property and collectivized all 
the land.  The German occupying authorities released Crimean Tatar prisoners of war, and excused 
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Tatars from labor duty. In addition, Crimean Tatars were relieved of heavy tax duties, allowed to 
practice their religion openly, and offered education in the Tatar language. A Moslem Committee 
was created in Simferopol, and Crimean Tatars were appointed to administrative positions within 
it. Such policies garnered strong support for the occupying force from many Crimean Tatars, 
particularly among older residents whose suffering under Stalin’s brutal collectivization policies 
was not forgotten. In exchange for such privileges, some Tatars did in fact collaborate with the 
German occupation by revealing key strategic information, such as the positions of partisan troops 
as well as Soviet army plans. 
Yet, most Tatars refused to work for the Wehrmacht, in part because of German brutality 
against inhabitants of Tatar villages. Furthermore, during this time ten percent of the Crimean 
Tatar population was mobilized and forced to fight on the front lines for Hitler;21 almost every 
family had a close relative serving. In addition, a majority of Crimean Tatars retained their loyalty 
to the Soviet government, based in part on their consumption of Soviet propaganda urging them 
to resist the German occupiers.22 
At the beginning of the war, Soviet newspapers recounted acts of courage and heroism by 
Tatar soldiers. These accounts fostered patriotism in Crimean Tatars, and intensified hatred toward 
the Germans. Every issue of these newspapers published accounts of atrocities committed by the 
German troops, the progress of the Soviet army, and the courage of Crimean Tatar soldiers and 
guerillas fighting alongside and with the Soviet army. The leading Crimean newspaper, Krasnyi 
Krym, generally portrayed the Tatar people as coexisting peacefully for centuries with their “older 
brother―the great Russian nation.”  In these accounts, all nationalities in the Soviet Union were 
acting in unison against their common, and evil, adversary.23 One such article recounts the brutality 
of the German army: 
Brother- Tatars! You are in the occupied territory among the enemy. You see and feel the 
horrors of the Fascist occupation. The Germans send your sons to the frontline. They rape your 
daughters; they turn you into powerless slaves. They condemned you to starvation and death.24 
As Crimean Tatars were positioned in unity with other nationalities in the “Soviet family,” the 
boundary divisions between Crimean Tatars (as “brothers”) and Germans (as the “vicious enemy”) 
intensified. 
The newspapers repeatedly cast the Germans as colonizers seeking to destroy the cultural 
heritage of the people: “The Germans try to sow discord among people of the Crimea. They set 
Russians against Jews, Tatars against Russians. This is an old trick of colonizers.”25 The proclamation 
made by German occupying forces that they would bring freedom to Tatars was unmasked in these 
narratives as part of a devious campaign of colonization, linked to their true mission to destroy 
the nation’s honor and pride, and to plunder the rich Crimean soil.26 But the Soviet army—it 
was promised—would soon reenter the peninsula and dispel the Wehrmacht, according to the 
newspaper accounts.
Some of the articles at this time do mention the collaboration of Crimean Tatars with the 
German army, but the reports state that such collaboration occurred only after German deception, 
provocation, and coercion. Even so, the collaborators were viewed as traitors to the nation. 
According to one article, 
[The Germans] created the so-called Tatar Committee, but it is clear to everyone that this 
committee is the slave of the German–colonizers, it works for Fascists and helps rob and deceive 
the Tatar people.27
The articles referred to an old Russian proverb that there is no village without a dog, implying 
that every community has its own degenerates (urody obshestva) and there are some traitors within 
any community—but such cases were presented as rare. In general, the Crimean Tatar population 
remained loyal to Soviet rule and was viewed as such.  
The Soviet authorities drew upon cultural images of tight-knit Crimean Tatar communities, 
which emphasized family security and respect for elders, to show that the willingness of some 
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Crimean Tatars to join the German army was like an act of youthful rebellion against the wider 
family. By casting enemy collaboration in familial terms, forgiveness for such transgressions and 
re-unification of the greater Soviet family could result, presumably, from acts of repentance on the 
part of the rebellious child. 
As the war progressed, Soviet propaganda sought to intensify national pride by promoting images 
of the heroism of the multicultural Soviet army. Acts of enemy collaboration by a few individuals 
were presented as cases of character flaws, likened to the betrayal of selling one’s ancestral land. 
Newspaper stories stressed that the Soviet army included soldiers of all racial and ethnic groups, 
in stark contrast to the racist policies of the Wehrmacht, which followed the National Socialist racial 
policies, and considered all non-Arians as Untermenschen and prohibited people of inferior races 
from fighting in its ranks.28 Many articles offered personalized accounts of the hardships of Crimean 
Tatar troops and featured the life stories of those who demonstrated outstanding courage.29 
As the Soviet army recovered its territory from the Wehrmacht in the later stages of the 
war, the number of articles glorifying the heroic deeds of Tatars rapidly decreased. The Soviet 
propaganda machine shifted from publishing inspiring stories in pursuit of national unity to 
narrative tactics that served the need to return a sense of normalcy to the reoccupied territory. 
Following a new government campaign, the newspapers abandoned their earlier characterization 
of Crimean Tatars as rebellious younger brothers and portrayed them, among other ethnic groups, 
as enemy accomplices. These portrayals castigated these groups as traitors who deserved severe 
punishment. Moreover, based on this characterization future generations of Crimean Tatars should 
be condemned for the actions committed by their ancestors during the war. Dehumanizing images 
of Tatars were spread throughout the general population, representing a stark contrast to the 
glorification of those who had served in the Red Army.  
The official decision to deport all Tatars from Crimea between 1942 and 1943 required careful 
planning and forethought at the highest levels of government. In his secret correspondence to Stalin 
months prior to the decision to deport Tatars, Levrentii Beria, the head of NKVD (the organization 
preceding the KGB), characterized all Crimean Tatars as traitors. In one transmission Beria writes: 
The devastating situation in the occupied territories of Crimea can be explained by the 
diversion group. 1178 people who helped the German army were arrested. The Tatar national 
committee, which had branches in various regions in Crimea, mobilized volunteers into the 
Nazi Tatar division and sent the non-Tatar population to the labor camps in Germany.30 
In another letter, Beria states that during the Second World War, Crimean Tatars acted as accomplices 
to German occupiers:  
Many Crimean Tatars betrayed their Motherland, deserted from the army and joined the 
army of the enemy, participated in the voluntary Nazi divisions, [and] participated in the 
barbaric and cruel killings of the Soviet people.31
As such correspondence was taking place, the People Commissar on Internal Affairs and the 
People Commissar on State Security imposed a law (Ukase) in April 1944 designed to punish all 
anti-Soviet elements operating in areas previously occupied by the Wehrmacht. According to this 
law, the Crimean peninsula was to be cleared of “agents of German and Romanian intelligence, 
traitors, collaborators, members of crime organizations.”  The law’s intent is conveyed as follows: 
To clear the territory of the Crimean region from the agents of foreign intelligence agencies 
and contra-intelligence groups, of those who betrayed their country and traitors, who 
actively helped Nazi-German occupation forces and their agents, of participants of anti-
Soviet organizations, bandit groups and other anti-Soviet elements that helped occupations 
forces (13 April, 1944). 
Interestingly, the law lacked particular reference to any specific ethnic affiliation of the enemy 
elements.
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In a secret wire to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov two weeks later, Beria reported on the 
number of members of each nationality living in Crimea who were killed, taken to labor camps by 
the German army, or evacuated by the Soviets: 
On Crimea. The population of the Crimea before the war—1,126,000 people, including 218,000 
Tatars. Killed 67 thousands of Jews, Karaimov, Krymchakov, taken to Germany—50,000 
people, evacuated 5,000 people.32  
Beria explained that the high number of casualties in Crimea resulted from the work of saboteurs 
and anti-Soviet elements among the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar National Committee was cited as 
working closely with voluntary German divisions, supplying intelligence on Soviet operations, 
and sending non-Tatar natives to the German labor camps. The document stated:
The Tatar National Committee, having its own branches in every Tatar district in Crimea, 
recruited intelligence agents to work in the occupied territories, enlisted volunteers to 
the created German Tatar division, [and] sent the local non-Tatar population for work in 
Germany. 
Crimean Tatar families, women, and elders were identified as traitors aiding those hiding 
from the Soviet army. These accusations had the effect of intensifying prevailing divisions between 
those who were considered loyal Soviet peoples and the supposedly treasonous Crimean Tatars. 
In a later telegram to Stalin, Beria established for the first time an ethnic designation to anti-
Soviet elements operating during the war.33 He wrote that more than twenty thousand Crimean 
Tatar soldiers deserted the Soviet army and joined German forces. 
Considering treacherous action of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet people and 
considering unfeasibility of the further residency of Crimean Tatars on the border of the 
Soviet Union, NKVD asks for your consideration of deportation of all Crimean Tatars from 
the territory of Crimea.34 
In this communiqué, Beria recommended to Stalin that the entire Crimean Tatar population be 
deported to the Uzbek Soviet Republic. Before writing this memo, Beria had already informed 
the head of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan about this impending deportation, anticipating 
no obstacles to his proposal of this state-sponsored brutality. He stated that the operation would 
start on May 21 and last for about ten days.  In the letter to Stalin, Beria wrote, “the issue of settling 
the Tatars in Uzbek SSR is arranged with the Secretary of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, 
comrade Usupov.”35 
The day after receiving this correspondence, Stalin signed the deportation decree.  A top-
secret document dated May 11, 1944 recounts that the Soviet State Defense Committee set the 
decree in motion, ordering the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar nationality from the 
Crimean peninsula. Many Crimean Tatars were accused of treason, deserting their military units, 
embracing the enemy’s goal of conquest, and serving in Schutzmannschaftsbataillonen (police 
battalions). The document additionally asserted that Crimean Tatars acted inhumanely against the 
Soviet guerrillas, actively engaged in transporting Soviet people to German labor camps, gathered 
intelligence for the enemy, and sabotaged Soviet military operations. Instead of being cheered 
as war heroes or scolded as younger brothers, the Crimean Tatars were now repositioned as a 
monolithic unit, a dangerous enemy bloc whose recent campaign of mass treachery necessitated 
the deportation of the entire population to Uzbek Soviet Republic by June 1, 1944. These drastic 
measures were allegedly required to prevent any additional collaboration of Crimean Tatars with 
potential sympathizers to the retreating German army.  
Moreover, although the Germans were in retreat and certainly losing the war by this time, the 
idea that they could have used Crimean Tatars to establish alliances with Turkey and with segments 
of the Muslim population prompted concern among the Soviet officials that the Tatars could take up 
the banner and threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Union by fostering Muslim solidarity across the 
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region. Despite such frenzied accusations, the few documented cases of collaboration by Crimean 
Tatars were wildly exaggerated by propagandists.36 
The Soviet fear of losing Crimea to the Wehrmacht army even after their departure prompted 
the authority to deport so-called unreliable elements of the population into Central Asia. But 
even in possession of totalitarian controls, the Soviet leaders still required a public justification 
for such widespread actions launched against this ethnic group. With vitriolic hatred of Germans 
still deeply ingrained in the collective psyche, the positioning practices began to shift, and a new 
enemy group emerged.37 But unlike Germans, who, as invaders, were never in close proximity 
to the majority of the Soviet population, Tatars inhabited the land for centuries and lived freely 
among the Soviet people. Their perceived betrayal felt personal, close to home, and fratricidal. 
Many segments of the general population found in the Tatars convenient scapegoats.38 to explain 
the source of their current misery. Tatars were blamed for the miserable conditions of service in 
the Soviet army, and the lack of basic necessities for survival for many members of the general 
population. The positioning tactics of the propaganda campaign established a normative order that 
exiled the outgroup not only physically but socially, forever tainting them with the stain of treason.
The Soviet political elite skillfully exploited the emotional trauma among the population. In 
May 1944, with little forewarning, Tatar women, children, and the elderly were loaded into freight 
trains and transported to Central Asia, primarily to Uzbekistan.  Lacking food, water or adequate 
sanitation, many Tatars died in transit. Those who survived the journey were confined to special 
zones for their residency. The vigilance of lower Party officials to meet pre-established quotas 
resulted in many Tatars abandoning their property and personal possessions. The settlements of 
Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan turned into permanent residences. Tremendous economic, political, 
and social hardships ensued. Beria’s plea to Stalin to implement a “cleaning [cleansing] process 
of Crimean population from the anti-Soviet elements” resulted in thinking clinically about the 
whole operation. Almost every day for four months preceding the final arrests and deportations, 
Stalin received progress reports which reduced the tragic events for thousands of families to 
numerical measurements—the number of people deported, the number of arrests, and the number 
of appropriated houses, cattle, and other domestic animals.
The secrecy of Soviet institutions kept the general population ignorant of the numerous 
atrocities committed by the Soviet government against its people. Those who expressed disapproval 
of inhumane treatment of minority groups were denounced as enemies of the people. Nevertheless, 
stories about mass deportation and arrests began to circulate unofficially throughout the country. 
Many segments of the general population learned about the deportation of Crimean Tatars to 
Uzbekistan, as well as the dispersion of Chechens, Koreans, and Volga Germans to Kazakhstan. 
Other small ethnic minorities, such as the Karachay, Ingush, Balkar, and Kalmyk, were also 
scattered across vast Soviet territories. But few realized the scale of the tragedy, or the full extent of 
demonization campaign against the Tatars and other minorities.  
During post-war reconstruction in the Soviet Union, a large number of deportees sought to 
return to their homeland. Yet the need to control the interactions of multiple nationalities could 
not warrant such mobility. The Supreme Committee of the Soviet Union passed an Ukas (decree) 
imposing severe punishment to anyone attempting to repatriate, citing that returning Crimean 
Tatars would serve as agents for foreign governments. The law demanded that each ethnic group 
be assigned a particular place of residence. Like so many of the edicts of the Soviet government, 
this law was established in secret.39
Repatriation—Exoneration of the Crimean Tatars
Over time, the cause for Crimean Tatar repatriation became widely recognized.  Beginning in 
1989, the liberal policies associated with Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika allowed more than a 
quarter of a million of Crimean Tatars to return to their historic homeland, predominantly from 
Uzbekistan.40 These policies were driven by the need to redress gross injustices of the past and the 
brutal mistreatment of this Turko-Muslim ethnic group.  As might be expected, many Crimean 
residents objected to Tatar repatriation.  Their allegedly treasonous deeds during the war were 
not forgotten or forgiven. The Tatars were stigmatized as a danger to the Soviet people, citing 
alleged Tatar degeneracy.  In the half-century absence of Crimean Tatars from their homeland, 
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Tatar history and culture heritage were largely expunged from the population of Crimea as they 
were castigated as invaders who presence represents a threat to the legitimate residents of the 
peninsula.   
As an extended arm of the reigning political institutions, the mass media actively embraced 
government policies for the repatriation of exiled ethnic groups; however, their simultaneous 
coverage of public demonstrations and conflicts among the local population in Crimea perpetuated 
strong negative images of returning Crimean Tatars.  Letters to the Editor of the large newspaper 
Argumenty i facty (Arguments and Facts) denounced attempts by Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. 
Their claims to return to their historic homeland were dismissed as groundless. Most returnees 
were accused of never having lived in Crimea. Tatars were accused of marrying outside of their 
ethnic group and thus relinquishing their right to return. Because the USSR was viewed as a 
fatherland for all people residing in its territory regardless of their ethnic identity (or nationality in 
Soviet policy), the desire to return to a designated homeland represented a lack of patriotism. Once 
again, the practices of identity positioning returned to the idea of the greater Soviet family to suit 
the needs of the dominant group. The very act of Tatars pursuing repatriation (among other rights) 
was viewed as the work of extremist nationals.41
As the number of Crimean Tatars returning to the peninsula increased, ethnic hostilities 
intensified in Crimea. After extended political debate in the late 1980s over the rights of Crimean 
Tatars, representatives of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine held dialogues 
between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, seeking to decrease social tensions and prevent 
extremist tendencies toward repatriation in the population. Some Committee officials were sent 
to Uzbekistan, the major source of repatriates, to discourage the migration of large numbers of 
people. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the Soviet Ministers of Ukraine revisit the 
history of the peninsula, particularly the period of Second World War, to install a monument in 
commemoration of the Crimean Tatars soldiers who died during the war.42  These positioning 
tactics embraced a policy of “keep them where they are.”  The Department of Information and 
Popularization of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine advised the Ukrainian 
media to promote peaceful coexistence among the diverse ethnic group of the Crimean peninsula.43 
The Ukrainian newspapers called for harmonious ethnic relations and stressed long traditions of 
respectful and peaceful coexistence between Tatars and the Ukrainian population. They condemned 
attempts to sow seeds of discord among the citizens of the Ukraine.44 According to some articles, 
Crimea had sufficient resources to meet the needs of all returning ex-patriots.45 
And yet, economic challenges contributed to escalating tensions between current residents 
and the newcomers to Crimea. To aggravate tensions, the government could not provide all 
returnees with affordable housing, equal educational opportunities, or adequate medical 
services. The newspapers repeatedly raised the following rhetorical question: “Where does one 
get various resources?”46 The dissolution of the Soviet Union increased economic burdens on 
the local government. Lacking governmental support, many returning Crimean Tatars settled in 
locations that were prohibited by government authorities. The formation of unauthorized self-
seized settlements, known as samozahvat, enraged the local population. Newspapers reported that 
samozahvat destroyed 238 hectares of fertile land.47 Hundreds of houses built by the newly arrived 
Crimean Tatars were bulldozed; hundreds were denied registration, jobs, and education. The rights 
for housing and settlement became a point of contention between the government of Ukraine and 
the Tatar mejelice, a local elected governing office.
Public officials and the media eventually recognized the scarcity of resources to meet the basic 
needs of the general population. The voices that encouraged resettlement were met with disdain 
from most members of the population. Some of these critics saw the fount of troubles as coming 
“from the top” by government authorities.48 Old labels, stories, and prejudices reflecting well-worn 
patterns of ethnic hostility resurfaced. Many articles cast Crimean Tatars as traitors for serving in 
the German army.49 The economic prosperity of some Crimean Tatar families was attributed to their 
inherent criminal character, as evident in practices such as money laundering and government 
corruption, rather than to their hard work.50 Many members of the general public even positioned 
Tatars as barbarians.51 Tatars were denigrated as culturally backwards, lacking adequate language 
skills, and unsuited for modern life.52
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In general, economic hardships often force people to blame an ethnic or minority group 
that differs from the predominant population. The citizens of Crimea during the 1980s argued 
that the peninsula was being invaded by traitors who sought to transform Crimea to Tatarland 
(otatarivshiy).53 Despite certain official proclamations regarding the need to exonerate Tatars from 
past allegations, returning Tatars accused by some officials of engaging in a sinister campaign of 
conquest over the rightful residents of Crimea. These officials went as far as to argue that Crimean 
Tatars lost all their rights as a result of their deportation to the Central Asia.54 
As they began to repatriate, some Crimean Tatars responded to their continued provocation 
with aggressive statements, political challenges, and in some cases violence.  Attempts to reclaim lost 
property led to numerous attacks against the local population.  Crimean Tatar officials threatened 
that, once in power, they would deny residency for all non-Tatar populations in Crimea.55  Such 
rhetoric further incited animosity and escalated the struggle to a state that approached civil war. 
Crimean Tatars in Occupied Crimea
In February 2014 Russia took control of Crimea and occupied the peninsula. On March 16, 2014 
the Crimean Government held a referendum on the status of Crimea. The aim of the referendum 
was for the Crimean people to decide whether Crimean would join Russia as a federal subject, or 
if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine. 
According to Crimean authorities, 96.77 per cent of voters in Crimea supported joining Russia. 
Many Crimeans loyal to Kiev, including Crimean Tatars, boycotted the referendum, and the EU 
and US condemned it as illegal.  The Joint Statement on Crimea issued by the President of the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel 
Barroso stated: “The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be recognized 
… We reiterate the strong condemnation of the unprovoked violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and call on Russia to withdraw its armed forces to their pre-crisis numbers and 
the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with relevant agreements.”56
Crimean Tatars together with other residents of the peninsula were forced to give up their 
Ukrainian citizenship for Russian citizenship. All Ukrainian citizens became foreigners in their 
own land and had to acquire a “residence permit.”57 Facing an illegal Russian Government, many 
Crimean Tatars decided to leave Crimea. According to Amnesty International, “up to 7,000 Tatars 
have fled Crimea already. Those who have stayed face the unenviable choice of having to give up 
their Ukrainian citizenship and accept a Russian one or become ‘foreigners’ in their homeland.”58
The highest executive body of Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis, has openly criticized Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea. Members of Mejlis recommended that all Crimean Tatars boycott both the 
March referendum on Crimea’s status and the September local elections. Most Crimean Tatars 
boycotted the March 16 illegal referendum on the status of Crimea, fully supporting Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity. They also boycotted Russian local elections held on September 14.
Mejlis also appealed to the Crimean authorities to disarm and make illegal the self-defense units 
in Crimea. These self-defense units were formed as armed paramilitary groups in late February with 
the aim of precluding any opposition to the referendum on Crimea’s status. Since then they have been 
involved in “unlawful detention, abduction, ill-treatment including torture, and harassment of pro-
Ukraine activists and other residents with complete impunity.”59 The self-defense units have also been 
a part of illegitimate searches of persons, properties, and vehicles, violent dispersals of meetings and 
public gatherings, and numerous attacks on representatives of the mass media. Crimean authorities 
did not launch any investigations regarding unlawful actions of self-defense units. Instead, in June 
2014, the parliament of Crimea passed the law On People’s Uprising that makes the self-defense units 
legal on the peninsula. The law authorized self-defense units to check identity documents and assist 
police in temporarily detaining people.60 Many units are operating without the presence of police. 
They regularly harass, interrogate, and sometimes beat people because they choose to do. 
Mejlis became the target of coercive actions by the Crimean Government. The prosecutor 
issued several statements describing the Mejlis actions as extremist activities, including a boycott 
of the September 14 local elections.61 In September, the de facto prime minister of Crimea stated 
publicly that the Mejlis was not a “legal organization” and that it had “very little authority” among 
the Crimean Tatar population.62
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The leaders of Mejlis were forced to live outside Crimea. On April 22, 2014 an informal leader 
of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Jemiliev, was informed by the Russian Federal Migration Service 
that he was a persona non grata in Crimea, and on May 2, 2014 he was refused entry to Moscow to 
board his flight to Crimea. The following day, he was stopped at the checkpoint between Crimea 
and mainland Ukraine. Several thousands Crimean Tatars created a human corridor welcoming 
Jemiliev into Crimea but he was refused entry. On May 4, 2014, the Chair of Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, 
received a written warning from the Prosecutor of Crimea stating that his activities and the activities 
of the Mejlis were in violation of Russian law on extremism.63 On July 5, 2014, on his return from the 
neighboring Ukrainian region of Kherson, Chubarov was stopped at a checkpoint by the Russian 
military and received notice of his five-year ban on entering the territory of Russia.64
The houses of other Mejlis members were routinely searched by Crimean authorities. For 
example, on the night of May 14, a day before planned public gatherings to commemorate the 
anniversary of the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, the authorities searched dozens of homes, 
including the home of Mustafa Dzhemilev and the Mejlis’ press secretary, Ali Khamzin. The 
authorities searched for weapons and explosives at the home of Mejlis member Edem Mustafaev.65 
The authorities also searched dozens of private residences of Crimean Tatars and conducted 
invasive, and some times illegal, searches of mosques and Islamic schools to look for drugs, 
weapons, and prohibited literature.   
Crimean authorities also denied Crimean Tatars’ right to freedom of expression, assembly 
and potentially association. For example, the ban imposed on all mass meetings in Crimea until 
June 6 impeded the events planned for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the mass 
deportation on May 18. Crimean Tatars were allowed only to hold a common prayer on the outskirts 
of the Crimean capital, Simferopol.
Unlawful detention, abductions, and the beating of Crimean Tatars also became a common 
feature in Crimea. In October, authorities arrested and charged three Crimean Tatars with violating 
the law during the protests of May 3. Human Rights Watch previously documented at least 15 
cases in which Crimean Tatars or pro-Ukraine activists were forcibly disappeared, abducted, or 
went missing in Crimea since March 2014. Six of them were later released but two of them were 
subsequently found dead.66 For example, on March 3, 39-year old Reshat Ametov had held a one-
man protest in front of the Crimean Council of Ministers building in Simferopol. Three men from 
the self-defense forces led him away and put him into their car. Two weeks later his body was found 
showing signs of torture. A criminal case that has been opened but has, as of yet, not result in any 
arrests.67 Edem Asanov, a Crimean Tatar who was not politically active but had posted information 
about the treatment of Crimean Tatars on his social network VKontakte, disappeared on September 
29 in Evpatoria. Six days later, police found Asanov’s body hanged in an abandoned building.  
Crimean Tatars’ media also became a target of Crimean authorities and self-defense units. 
Russia’s Federal Security Service and the Crimea prosecutor’s office have issued warnings to 
leading Crimean Tatar media outlets not to publish extremist materials and threatened editors that 
the outlets would not be allowed to re-register unless they changed their anti-Russian editorial line. 
The self-defense units publicly referred to ATR, the main Crimean Tatar channel that broadcasts 
in three languages: Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and Russian, as the enemy channel and since March 
attacked and beat several ATR journalists.68 On May 16, the Crimea prosecutor’s office issued an 
official warning to ATR’s leadership about its coverage of the mass gathering on May 3, stating that 
the channel had reported on the gathering’s participants making calls “of an extremist nature.”69 
According to Amnesty international, “ATR has received informal instructions from the authorities 
not to broadcast reports which included members of the Mejlis or leaders of the Crimean Tatar 
community, unless they were loyal to the Crimean authorities and Russia.”70 Several journalists 
and media workers have been detained and in some cases harassed and beaten. For example, on 
May 18, self-defense units detained Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev and his crew while 
they were filming a meeting in Simferopol. The self-defense units forced him and his colleagues 
to stand facing a wall and interrogated them, beating and harassing them for several hour. The 
journalists’ equipment was confiscated and never returned to them.71
All Ukrainian media was gradually removed from translating in Crimea. According to the 
OSCE, “Broadcasts from the six main Ukrainian television channels in Crimea have been blocked 
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and replaced with broadcasts from Russian channels. Since the end of June, cable television 
providers also stopped airing most leading Ukrainian-language channels in Crimea, including 
Inter, Channel 5, 1+1, and several others, significantly reducing the amount of televised Ukrainian-
language content.”72 Police seized the equipment and computers that belonged to Chernomorska 
(Black Sea) Television Company and the Center for Journalistic Investigation, a nonprofit group 
specializing in investigative journalism that had an office in the same building.73
Conclusion
Categorical violence against Crimean Tatars is rooted in the redefinition of social boundary and 
ascription of treacherous and rebellious attitudes to the entire ethnic group. During the Second 
World War, the Soviet authorities orchestrated a campaign to collectively reclassify certain ethnic 
minorities as a prelude to their deportation from their homelands. Such negative categorization 
soon became an instrument of terror. The demonization of Germans as Nazis by the Soviet 
propaganda machine intensified hatred toward their (perceived and actual) collaborators. 
Working in secrecy, Soviet propagandists exploited information about a few cases of Crimean 
Tatar collaboration with the German occupation to generate nationalistic hatreds that lasted for 
half a century.  
Significant reduction of the level of hostility toward the Crimean Tatar population began 
with perestroika and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The repatriation of Crimean Tatars in 
the beginning of the 1990s aimed to redress previous injustices and to compensate then for the 
hardships they experienced at the hands of the Soviet government. However, Crimean Tatars 
were ill-treated by local Crimean authorities and experienced discrimination from the Crimean 
population. They were denied access to land, work, and affordable housing. After Ukrainian 
independence they gradually acquired many rights but some issues remained unresolved. 
The illegal occupation of Crimea by Russia has again reignited hardship suffered by Crimean 
Tatars. They refused to acknowledge the new authority by boycotting the referendum on the 
status of Crimea and the local elections. In response, local government and militant self-defense 
forces targeted Mejlis leadership, activists and mass media representatives. Harassment, arrests, 
abductions, and beatings once again became a part of the everyday life for Crimean Tatars. Two 
Mejlis leaders were prohibited to live in Crimea and Mejlis actions were portrayed as extremist. 
The demonization of Crimean Tatars that started during the Second World War by the 
communist regime continues to play a definitive role in their positioning in society today. It provided 
the justification needed by the Crimean Government in the late 1980s to create impediments to the 
return of Crimean Tatars to their Motherland. Similar definitions of treason and extremism were 
employed by the authorities of illegally occupied Crimea in 2014. In all three situations, categorical 
violence based on the negative portrayal of Crimean Tatars has led to a denial of their rights, and 
the prosecution and harassment of leadership and ordinary citizens. 
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